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Constructionist approaches to emotion have existed since the time of William James, and are 
united in the assumption that the psychological events called "anger", "sadness", and "fear" are not 
the elemental building blocks of emotion, but instead are mental events that result from the 
interplay of more basic psychological systems. This paper summarizes the three fundamental 
hypotheses that ground the Conceptual Act Model, a recently introduced constructionist approach 
to emotion. First, the mental events that people refer to as "emotion" are constructed, in the blink 
of an eye; from more basic psychological primitives that are always in play. Second, psychological 
primitives are not themselves specific to emotion, and are hypothesized to participate to some 
degree in constructing every psychological moment. Third, factors that have traditionally been 
treated as non-emotional such as concepts and language play a central role in making an instance 
of emotion what it is. Implications of the Conceptual Act Model for the science of emotion are 
then discussed. 
 




In the last six years, my students and I have put forth what we hope is a novel 
approach to understanding the nature of emotion, called the Conceptual Act Model. 
The Conceptual Act Model is a social neuroscience model of emotion that respects 
the nature of the human brain. The logic and hypotheses that make up the model 
have been set out (in pieces) in a number of different papers (Barrett, 2005, 2006b, 
2006c, 2009, 2011; Barrett & Lindquist, 2008; Barrett, Lindquist, Bliss-Moreau et 
al., 2007; Barrett, Lindquist, & Gendron, 2007; Barrett, Mesquita, Ochsner, & 
Gross, 2007; Barrett, Ochsner, & Gross, 2006; Duncan & Barrett, 2007; Lindquist 
& Barrett, 2008). The goal of present article is distill the major social psychological 
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principles of the model and to contextualize the model past writings and future 
research. To begin, I briefly situate the Conceptual Act Model in the psychological 
history of emotion science. I then outline three of its defining hypotheses, and in so 
doing review emerging evidence from my lab that represents the beginning of a 
much larger empirical effort to evaluate the veracity of the model. I then discuss 
how the model builds on, but is distinct from, other constructionist models of 
emotion (most notably, Schachter & Singer, 1962). Finally, I end by discussing 
how the Conceptual Act Model moves the science of emotion forward.  
 
A Brief Psychological History of Emotion 
 
The Conventional View 
 
To many researchers, the psychological history of emotion is straightforward. 
The golden age of emotion research begins with Darwin's (Darwin 1859/1965) 
publication of "Expressions of the emotions in man and animals" (emotions cause 
stereotypic bodily expressions), followed by James' (James 1884) critique in "What 
is an emotion?" (bodily activity causes emotion, not the other way around). James, 
in turn, was criticized by Cannon in his 1927 paper "The James-Lange theory of 
emotions: A critical examination and an alternative theory" (the body cannot cause 
emotion because visceral changes are too slow and too difficult to feel, and the 
same visceral changes occur in both emotional and non-emotional states) (Cannon, 
1927).  
Psychology, the story goes, by then in the grip of behaviorism, sank into the 
dark ages, and did not produce anything worthwhile on the topic of emotion for 
about 40 years, although some important neurobiology papers by Papez (1937) and 
MacLean (1949) were published.  
A renaissance period then was said to emerge in the 1960's, first with Magda 
Arnold's "Emotion and Personality" (Arnold, 1960), followed by "Affect-Imagery-
Consciousness" (Tompkins, 1962, 1963) and Schachter & Singer's (1962) paper 
entitled "Cognitive, social, and physiological determinants of an emotional state." 
As the conventional history goes, these works rescued the science of emotion and 
set it on its current course, solidifying the two competing perspectives that 
essentially define the modern approach to emotion. As psychological events, 
emotions are either discussed as complex reflexes that are automatically triggered 
by objects and events in the world (the "basic emotion" approach), or as 
automatically triggered by a meaningful interpretation of the situation (the 
"appraisal approach"). In effect, these works launched the modern era of scientific 
research on emotion.  
In psychological research on emotion today, the question of what emotions are 
and how they function is largely answered in either basic emotion or appraisal 
terms. The basic emotion vs. appraisal distinction not only shapes the scientific 
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present (influencing which questions are asked, how they are asked, and how the 
findings are interpreted), but it also forms the lens through which the scientific past 
is viewed. Emphasizing the difference between the two approaches masks what the 
two approaches have in common, however, and leaves unexamined an entire line of 
theorizing in science of emotion. 
 
An Unconventional Observation 
 
A close read of the literature reveals that there are really two different classes 
of appraisal models. The first class, derived from Arnold's writings, have a lot more 
in common with basic emotion models than might first be assumed (e.g., Frijda, 
1986; Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990; Scherer, 1984). "For each emotion, there is 
a distinct pattern that remains more or less constant and is recognized as 
characteristic for that emotion" wrote Arnold. "Whether we are afraid of a bear, a 
snake, or a thunderstorm, our bodily sensations during these experiences are very 
much alike. … there will always be a core that is similar from person to person and 
even from man to animal" (Arnold, 1960, p. 179). Appraisals were imbued with the 
power to diagnose objects or situations as personally relevant, and were given 
responsibility for triggering emotions that pre-exist within the individual, so that 
anger, sadness, fear, and so on, are different biological kinds that, in essence, are 
grounded in distinct behaviors. Essentially, Arnold has proposed that a meaning 
analysis will trigger basic emotions.  
When Arnold's writing is viewed in its proper context, then, basic emotion 
approaches and Arnold-style appraisal-as-cause models (where appraisals are the 
literal cognitive mechanisms that trigger recognizable syndromes of behavior and 
bodily reactions) are more similar than different (with basic emotion models 
focusing on the output side of the equation and appraisal models focusing on the 
input side). Together the basic emotion and appraisal-as-cause models form the 
current scientific paradigm for emotion science, in what has been called "the 
natural kind view" (Barrett, 2006a) or the modal model (Barrett, Lindquist, & 
Gendron, 2007) of emotion. Despite the differences in their surface features, these 
models all assume that the mental events that correspond to these English words, 
plus a few others ("fear" and "disgust"), have firm boundaries that can be observed 
in nature (meaning in the brain or body), and are therefore recognized, not 
constructed, by the human mind. Individual instances of an emotion category (e.g., 
anger) are presumed to cluster together in a meaningful way because they have 
something real in common (their physical signature and/or the neural module or 
cognitive pattern that produced them). In this view, emotions are like atoms – they 
are elemental features of the mind and brain. 
If Arnold's view was that a meaning analysis causes an emotion, then 
Schachter & Singer's (1962) view belongs to a second, rather different class of 
appraisal models where a meaning analysis constitutes what an emotion is as a 
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psychological event (e.g., Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Smith & Ellsworth, 
1985). These works, along with many papers and books that were published from 
1890 to 1970, constitute a constructionist approach to emotion that is very different 
from the natural kind view inspired by Tompkins and Arnold. Constructionist 
approaches are united in the assumption that the psychological events called 
"anger," "sadness," and "fear" are not basic, elemental building blocks of emotion, 
but instead are mental events that result from the interplay of more basic 
psychological systems (Brenner, 1974; Dashiell, 1928; Duffy, 1934, 1941; Dunlap, 
1932; Hunt, 1941; James, 1890, 1894; Mandler, 1975; Ruckmick, 1936; 
Schachter,1959; Titchener, 1909; Wundt, 1897; Young, 1943). James proposed 
what is, perhaps, the first constructionist approach to emotion. In The Principles of 
Psychology, James (1980) wrote: 
The trouble with the emotions in psychology is that they are regarded too much 
as absolutely individual things. So long as they are set down as so many eternal and 
sacred psychic entities, like the old immutable species in natural history, so long all 
that can be done with them is reverently to catalogue their separate characters, 
points, and effects. But if we regard them as products of more general causes (as 
'species' are now regarded as products of heredity and variation), the mere 
distinguishing and cataloguing becomes of subsidiary importance. Having the 
goose which lays the golden eggs, the description of each egg already laid is a 
minor matter (p. 449). 
This quote illustrates two of the grounding principles for constructionist views 
of emotion. First, emotions are states of mind that are assembled from more basic, 
general causes. Second, emotions are not psychic entities, but are highly variable 
mental states. James also makes clear a key implication of the constructionist 
approach to emotion: psychology must develop from a science that classifies 
emotional states into a science that explains their existence. 
 
A Modern Constructionist Approach: The Conceptual Act Model 
 
Recently, my lab has introduced a constructionist approach, called the 
Conceptual Act Model (Barrett, 2006a, 2009, 2011; Barrett, Lindquist, Bliss-
Moreau et al., 2007; Barrett, Lindquist, & Gendron, 2007; Barrett, Mesquita et al., 
2007; Lindquist, Wager, Kober, Bliss-Moreau, Barrett, in press). Like other 
constructionist models, the Conceptual Act Model states that an emotion word, like 
"anger", names a commonsense category that corresponds to a range of mental 
events that emerge from the interaction of more basic psychological ingredients. In 
this model, emotions are perceptions – they are mental contents, not process. They 
are not modules in the brain, but they do, of course, correspond to brain states.  
The Conceptual Act Model can be summarized as three basic hypotheses. First, 
the mental events that people refer to as "emotion" are constructed, in the blink of 
an eye, from more basic two psychological processes that are always in play: a 
psychologically basic and biologically basic mammalian system that produces 
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some variation on positive or negative states (producing variations in "core affect") 
and a human conceptual system for emotion (i.e., what people "know" about 
emotion) that could exist in a more limited form in non-human great apes. As a 
result, different instances that people refer to by the same word ("anger") can feel 
and look very different, and mental referred to by different words ("anger" and 
"fear") are not caused by different mechanisms. In this view, emotions are not 
natural kinds. As a consequence, the model predicts (rather than explains away) the 
considerable variability in emotional life that has been observed within individuals 
over time, across individuals from the same culture, and of course across cultures. 
Second, psychological primitives are not themselves specific to emotion, and are 
hypothesized to participate to some degree in constructing every psychological 
moment. The implication is that certain aspects of emotion (e.g., core affect) can 
play an intrinsic role in what people consider to be non-emotional events (e.g., 
seeing). The more far reaching consequence of this hypothesis is that the mental 
events people call "emotions" and "cognitions" and "perceptions" differ 
phenomenologically, but may themselves not be natural kinds (for a more extended 
discussion, see Duncan & Barrett, 2007). Third, factors that have traditionally been 
treated as non-emotional such as concepts and language play a central role in 
making an instance of anger what it is. In this view, understanding the meaning 
emotion words and emotion concepts is a piece of the puzzle to understanding what 




The first defining hypothesis of the conceptual act model is that there are a 
number of psychological primitives that combine like ingredients to make a variety 
of mental states that people call "emotion." The first psychological primitive that 
creates mental life is a core affective system that consists of neurobiological states 
that can be described as pleasant or unpleasant with some degree of arousal (Figure 
1; for reviews, see Barrett, 2006c; Russell, 2003).  
 
Figure 1. A Map of Core Affect: The Affective Circumplex.  
Taken from Barrett and Russell (1998) 
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The general function of this core affect system is to integrate incoming sensory 
information from the external world with homeostatic and interoceptive 
information from the body to produce a mental state that can be used to safely 
navigate the world, by predicting reward and threat, friend and foe. People are often 
aware of their core affective state, although they need not be.  
The idea of core affect as a psychological primitive is distinct from the more 
general usage of the word "affect" to mean anything emotional. Core affect has 
been characterized as the constant stream of transient alterations in an organism's 
neurophysiological and somatovisceral state that represent its immediate 
relationship to the flow of changing events (Barrett 2006c; Russell, 2003; Russell 
& Barrett 1999); in a sense, core affect is a neurophysiologic barometer of the 
individual's relationship to an environment at a given point in time. To the extent 
that an object or event changes a person's "internal milieu", it can be said to have 
affective meaning – these changes are what we mean when we say that a person 
has an affective reaction to an object or stimulus. They are the means by which 
information about the external world is translated into an internal code or 
representations (Damasio, 1999; Nauta, 1971; Ongur & Price, 2000). When sensory 
information from the world sufficiently influences a person's internal bodily state 
(which can be experienced as pleasant or unpleasant with some degree of arousal), 
the processing of that information is prioritized, so that the resulting object is more 
easily seen (for a review see Vuillieumier & Driver, 2007) and remembered (for a 
review see Kensinger & Schacter, in press). 
The experience of feeling an emotion, or the experience of seeing emotion in 
another person, requires the participation of a second psychological primitive, 
which is effectively "what people 'know' about emotion". This conceptual system is 
a storehouse of knowledge that is sculpted by prior experience. It is system of rich, 
context-specific concepts for anger, sadness, and fear (or whatever the categories 
are in your culture) that people use to categorize core affect. People easily and 
effortlessly experience anger and sadness and fear and see these emotions in others 
because, in the blink of an eye, they conceptualize (or categorize) the ebb and flow 
of core affect, bounding it as a discrete experience. This corresponds to the 
colloquial idea of "having an emotion."  
Categorizing is an on-going, fundamental cognitive activity, and constitutes the 
brain's prediction for what sensory information means (e.g., Bar, 2007). To 
categorize something is to render it meaningful; it is to determine what something 
is, why it is, and what to do with it. It then becomes possible to make reasonable 
inferences about that thing, predict how to best to act on it, and communicate our 
experience of the thing to others. In the construction of emotion, the act of 
categorizing core affect performs a kind of figure-ground segregation (Barsalou, 
1999, 2003), so that the experience of an emotion will pop-out as a separate event 
from the ebb and flow in on-going core affect (where core affect is associated with 
the direction and urgency of initial behavioral responses). In doing so, people 
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divide ongoing changes in core affect into meaningful experiences. 
Conceptualizing core affect renders it intentional (about something), so that we 
experience our own core affect as meaning that the world is a particular way, or 
experience another person's core affect as emotional behavior and infer something 
about their experience of the world in the process. Conceptualizing also allows us 
to make reasonable inferences about what to do next, and to communicate with 
others in an efficient manner. So, when you feel angry, for example, you have 
categorized your core affect using your conceptual knowledge of anger (Figure 2a). 
As a result, you will experience your unpleasant, high arousal state as evidence that 
someone is offensive. In fear, you will experience the same state as evidence that 
the world is threatening (Figure 2b). Another example, when you feel sad you have 
categorized your core affect using your conceptual knowledge of sadness (Figure 
2c). And either way, you will behave accordingly.  
 
Figure 2. Depicting the Conceptualization of Core Affect 
(a) A momentary core affective state that is 
negative and high in arousal conceptualized as 
an instance of anger (where an instance of 
conceptual knowledge for "anger" is 
represented by contour lines of probability to 
reflect its situated and probabilistic nature) 
 
(b) Core affect as conceptualized as an 




   
(c) Core affect as conceptualized as an instance of sadness 
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Concepts, in this view, are not amodal (lists of beliefs or propositions), but are 
embodied (e.g., Barsalou, 2008; Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-
Gruber, & Ric, 2005), blurring the boundary between conception and perception. In 
the conceptual act model, the conceptualization of core affect is not something that 
occurs after the fact, as in the common idea of interpreting or cognizing a snapshot 
of affective change after it has taken place. Instead, an instance of a concept, to the 
extent that it is expressed as a brain state that includes activity in sensory and motor 
neurons (some of which may be representing affect), intrinsically shapes the mental 
event that emerges as an emotion.1
According to the Conceptual Act Model, you don't have one concept for anger, 
you have a collection and they can be combined in any number of diverse and 
flexible ways. Following the work on situated conceptualizations, the conceptual 
knowledge that is called forth to categorize affect in a given instance is tailored to 
the immediate situation, acquired from prior experience, and supported by 
language. For example, core affect can be categorized as anger when another driver 
 This suggests, of course, the any particular 
pattern of physiological or motor activity that is observed in a given instance of 
anger will be influenced both by a person's core affective state and whatever 
conceptual knowledge they bring to bear during the categorization process at a 
given point in time. 
                                                 
1 More formally, then, a situated conceptualization of anger (that is, an instance of conceptualizing 
anger) is produced by a simulator (or set of simulators). A simulator for a category of knowledge, 
like anger, develops as sensory, motor, and somatovisceral features are integrated across instances 
and settings where instances of anger are labeled. Sensory information about the object that is in 
the focus of attention (e.g., visual information about the person you are interacting with, auditory 
information about his or her voice, as well as that person’s relation to you in this instance), 
somatovisceral information about your core affective state (i.e., your current homeostatic state in 
the relational context), motor programs for interacting with that person, and for regulating your 
own core affective behavior, associated with unpleasant, high arousal states (e.g., facial 
movements, body movements, loudness of the voice), as well as the label "anger" (provided by 
yourself or others), and so on, bind together (via conjunctive neurons; Simmons & Barsalou, 2003) 
to form an instance of anger. Said more simply, properties that are pointed out by parents (or other 
speakers) or those that are functionally relevant in everyday activities will bind to core affect to 
represent anger in that instance. As instances of anger accumulate, and information is integrated 
across instances, a simulator for anger develops, and conceptual knowledge about anger accrues. 
The resulting conceptual system is a distributed collection of modality-specific memories captured 
across all instances of a category. These establish the conceptual content for the basic level 
category anger, and can be retrieved for later simulations of anger. Once a simulator for an 
emotion category, such as anger, is established, it is available to re-enact small subsets of its 
content as specific simulations as needed. When conceptual knowledge about anger is primed, 
either by an aspect of sensory environment, by a motor action, or by a deliberate need to explain 
core affect, the simulator becomes active, and generates a representation of anger that is tailored to 
the particular context or situation. For example, the anger simulator might simulate a state of core 
affect with yelling on one occasion, core affect with running on another, and core affect with 
crying on yet another. All the experienced content for anger resides within the simulator for anger, 
so that different combinations can be simulated as the situation requires. 
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cuts off in traffic, and you yell and wave your fist; when a disobedient child breaks 
a rule, and you calmly re-explain; when you hear the voice of a hated politician, 
and you turn off the radio; when a colleague insults your opinion, and you sit very 
still and perhaps even smile; when you tease a friend instead of criticize; or when 
you stub your toe and kick the kitchen table.  
When combined, core affect and conceptual knowledge about emotion (along 
with controlled attention; see below) produce a highly flexible system that can 
account for the full richness and range of experience that characterizes human 
emotional life (including the appearance of distinct biobehavioral profiles of 
emotional response however rarely they occur). The ability to categorize confers 
some adaptive advantage, and so is likely evolutionarily preserved, even if the 
specific categories are not. Many cultures may share similar emotion concepts 
(basic in the Roschian sense) because these concepts are optimal tools for 
negotiating in the kind of social environment that humans typically occupy (living 
in large groups with complicated relational rules).  
In my lab, we now have preliminary evidence that at least one emotion - fear - 
can be constructed from the interplay of more basic elements of core affect and 
conceptual knowledge about fear (Lindquist & Barrett, in press). We also 
completed a recent meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies of emotion showing that 
brain activations during emotion fit the Conceptual Act Model better than they do a 
natural kind approach (Lindquist et al., in press). Moreover, using a novel 
neuroimaging paradigm we recently demonstrated that situated conceptual 
knowledge is, in fact, a key element in emotional experiences (Wilson-Mendenhall, 
Barrett, Simmons, & Barsalou, 2011). 
Although the Conceptual Act Model has largely focused on the interplay 
between two psychological primitives, it seems clear that a third psychological 
primitive can be found in the controlled attention network that resolves conflict 
between competing representations or inhibiting pre-potent responses when 
necessary (Miller & Cohen 2001). Controlled attention has been referred to as the 
central executive (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974), the Supervisory Attention System 
(Norman & Shallice, 1986), executive control (Posner & DiGirolamo, 2000) and 
working memory capacity (Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004). It continually shapes 
processing, often without any of the four elements that given a subjective feeling of 
control first discussed by James (1890), and Hemholtz (1910/1925) and later 
elaborated by Bargh (1994) (i.e., a feeling of agency, effort, control, or awareness).  
One hypothesis is that the degree of controlled attention in play during 
conceptualization will influence the modularity of emotion perception and 
emotional action. A cognitive module is defined as a fast, domain specific set of 
processes that have evolved to handle particular types of information. Modules are 
assumed to be encapsulated and impenetrable (activities and outputs cannot be 
influenced by other classes of information such as expectations or beliefs), 
reflexive (they provide predetermined outputs when predetermined inputs are 
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present), and unconscious (it is impossible to reflect upon the operations of a 
module). Working memory capacity may produce a kind of "functional 
modularity", however, where a system appears modular, but only because of 
insufficient attention (rather than because of the architecture of the brain systems 
themselves. Individuals who are lower in working memory capacity, or situations 
which require intensive attentional resources, may produce functionally modular 
conceptualizations of their affective state that results in less flexible and therefore 
less functionally effective emotional episodes (cf. Barrett et al., 2004).  
 
Psychological Primitives in Mental Life 
 
The second idea that defines the Conceptual Act Model is that psychological 
primitives are not themselves specific to emotion and are participate to some degree 
in constructing every psychological moment. This can be seen in how the concept 
of core affect differs from the more generic use of the term affect: core affect is a 
hypothesized to be a fundamental feature of consciousness. The broad, distributed 
circuitry for core affect projects both directly and indirectly to sensory cortices and 
coordinates sensory processing in the entire cortical mantle via a series of bottom-
up and top-down routes (summarized in Barrett & Bar, 2009; Duncan & Barrett, 
2007). Because core affect modulates sensory processing, any psychological 
process that draws on sensory information will have an affective quality to it. As a 
result, core affect influences forms of cognitive activity that are traditionally 
considered distinct from emotion. Perhaps the most discussed example of affect's 
role in cognition comes from the literature on decision-making (e.g., Bechara, 
2004; Janis & Mann, 1977; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) but there is also evidence 
for affect's contribution to normal consciousness, language and memory (for a 
review, see Duncan & Barrett, 2007). In our most recent work, we have 
demonstrated that core affect influences visual consciousness (Anderson, Siegel, & 
Barrett, 2011; Anderson, Siegel, Bliss-Moreau, & Barrett, 2011) and person 
perception (Anderson, Siegel, White, & Barrett, in press). 
Importantly, there is accumulating functional evidence that core affect 
influences the most basic stage of visual processing, as reflected in activity in 
primary visual cortex or V1. Neuroimaging studies report increased activation 
around the V1/V2 boundary in response to affectively evocative (compared to 
neutral) stimuli (e.g., Moll et al., 2002). In our recent meta-analysis of 
neuroimaging studies of emotion (Wager et al., 2008), we found that studies 
consistently report increased activation in V1 during affective (compared to 
neutral) conditions. In addition, we now have pilot evidence of increased V1 
activation and functional connectivity between V1 through V4 is produced by 
face/ring pairs that were presented outside the focus of attention, but whose 
affective value was enhanced (by pairing them with shock on a prior trial Damaraju 
et al., 2010). Additional evidence for affective modulation of V1 activity comes 
from a study using event related potentials (ERPs) to classically conditioned 
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images, where black and white gratings (CS+) previously paired with affectively 
evocative images (i.e. IAPS images) elicited higher amplitude ERPs recorded over 
primary visual cortex than did gratings (CS-) not paired with images (Stolarova, 
Keil, & Moratti, 2006); the increased CS+ event-related potential amplitude over 
V1 occurs roughly 50 ms post-stimulus onset, well before information could reach 
core affective circuitry and feedback to V1. Even pairing a neutral stimulus with 
reward changes the activation in early visual cortex (see work by the Wantanabe 
lab). Taken together, these data suggest that if stimulus is associated with an 
affective state, then it will receive enhanced sensory processing on your next 
encounter, even before you consciously see anything at all.  
Given the neuroanatomy of this circuitry, you can think of affect not as 
competing with attention (e.g., Vuillieumier & Driver, 2007) but as a source of 
attention in the mammalian brain that helps to binds sensory information from the 
external world to sensory information from the body. As a consequence, conscious 
percepts are intrinsically infused with affective content. This is why a drink tastes 
good or is unappetizing (e.g., Winkielman, Berridge, & Wilbarger, 2005), why we 
experience some people as nice, and others as mean; why some foods tastes good 
but others are distasteful; and why some paintings are beautiful while others are 
ugly. It is under these circumstances when core affect is experienced as a property 
of the world that it acts in stealth by directly translating into a behavior. When core 
affect is foregrounded in consciousness it is experienced as your reaction to the 
world: you like or dislike a drink, a person, or a painting. Or you experience 
foregrounded affect as emotion.  
In a fundamental sense, the Conceptual Act Model suggests that the broader 
categories of "emotion," "cognition," and "perception" reflect subjective 
distinctions rather than distinctions in kind (Barrett, 2009). The clearest evidence 
for this point is the fact that these categories seem not to be respected at the level of 
the brain. Many of the brain areas involved with the emergence of emotional 
episodes are typically considered cognitive (cf. Barrett, Mesquita et al., 2007; 
Duncan & Barrett, 2007; Kober et al., 2008; Lindquist et al., in press; a similar 
point is made by Pessoa, 2008). And areas that are involved in affective processing 
(e.g., ventromedial prefrontal cortex and closely related anterior cingulate cortices) 
are involved in a range of cognitive processes (e.g., vmPFC and ACC are part of 
the default network that is active during spontaneous, highly associative mental 
activity that occurs in the absence of an eliciting stimulus, and that is also active in 
memory and mental time travel; Buckner & Carroll, 2007). Ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex is also an important area for making predictions about the 
meaning of sensory stimulation during simple object perception (Bar, Aminoff, 
Mason, & Fenske, 2007) (for a discussion, see Suvak & Barrett, 2011). It might be 
more accurate to say that broad psychological categories "emotion" or even "anger" 
refer to collections of mental states that correspond to broadly distributed "neural 
reference spaces" (cf. Barrett, Mesquita et al., 2007). Psychological primitives (core 
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affect and categorization, as well as others we have not considered here, such as 
executive control) are the building blocks of the mind that constitute the neuronal 
assemblies that populate this neural reference space. 
 
The Role of Language in Emotion 
 
The third defining hypothesis of the Conceptual Act Model comes from the 
motivation for its inception. The Conceptual Act model was fashioned as a solution 
to the emotion paradox (Barrett, 2006b): studies that measure emotion by relying 
on human perception (subjective reports of feelings or judgments of other people's 
faces and bodies) typically produce consistent evidence for the categories that in 
English people call "anger," "sadness," and "fear;" but instrument-based measures 
of the brain, face, and body (what might be called "objective" measures) do not. 
But if the psychological events people refer to as "anger" have no signatures (no 
known statistical regularities to ground the categories), then how to people learn the 
category? What serves to glue the various instances of anger together into a single 
category if they look very different from one another – according to the Conceptual 
Act Model, the answer is a word.  
Words are powerful. Words facilitate the learning of novel categories (Lupyan, 
Rakison, & McClelland, 2007). As early as 6 months of age, words guide an 
infant's categorization of animals and objects by directing the infant to focus on the 
obvious and inferred similarities shared by animals or objects with the same name 
(Booth & Waxman, 2002; Fulkerson, Waxman, & Seymour, 2006). Xu, Cote, and 
Baker (2005) refer to words as "essence placeholders" because a word allows an 
infant to categorize a new object as a certain kind, and to make inductive inferences 
about the new object based on prior experiences with other objects of the same 
kind. Words are ontologically powerful for nominal kinds (artifact categories that 
exist because a group of people have a shared concept and name it with a word). In 
fact, a nominal kind might not exist without a word.  
This perspective suggests that words provide an important top-down context in 
emotion perception. For example, emotion words cause a perceptual shift in the 
way that emotional faces are seen. Morphed faces depicting an equal blend of 
happiness (or sadness) and anger were encoded as angrier when those faces were 
paired with the word "angry" and even angrier when participants were asked to 
explain why those faces were angry (Halberstadt, 2005; Halberstadt & Niedenthal, 
2001). Verbalizing any words at all disrupts the ability to make correct perceptual 
judgments about faces, presumably because it interferes with access to judgment-
necessary language (Roberson, Damjanovic, & Pilling, 2007; Roberson & 
Davidoff, 2000).  
In 2004, our lab launched a program of research to experimentally examine 
how changing the accessibility of an emotion word would impact emotion 
perception, and this research offers the most direct experimental evidence for the 
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role of language in emotion perception to date. We used a technique called 
semantic satiation to manipulate word accessibility. In the typical satiation 
experiment, participants repeat a category word out loud either 3 or 30 times, 
following which they judge whether or not a word or perceptual object is a member 
of the repeated category (i.e., does the exemplar match the repeated word or not). 
Prior research has found that, relative to repeating a word 3 times, repeating a word 
30 times leads to a temporary decrease in the accessibility of the word's meaning, 
slowing word associations, judgments of category membership, and identity 
recognition. In our original experiment (Lindquist, Barrett, Bliss-Moreau, & 
Russell, 2006, Study 1), we found that relative to repeating an emotion word 3 
times, repeating it 30 times led to slower and less accurate judgments of a 
subsequently presented face as matching the repeated word (or not). In subsequent 
studies, participants were presented with two pictures of facial behaviors depicting 
emotion following word repetition, and were asked to judge whether the faces 
matched each other or not. This ‘perceptual matching task' allowed us to examine 
how language influenced perception even though the participants were not required 
verbally to label the face stimuli. We found that participants were slower (Study 2) 
and less accurate (Study 3) to see the emotion (e.g., anger) in the faces of targets 
after the relevant emotion word ("anger") was satiated. By examining response 
times and accuracy rates for various trial types, we were able to rule out the 
possibility that the observed effects were merely due to fatigue. Furthermore, we 
now have preliminary evidence that emotion words participate in the construction 
of emotional percepts. We predicted and found that satiating the relevant emotion 
word interfered with the encoding of the emotional features of face depicting 
emotion (Gendron, Lindquist, Barsalou, & Barrett in press). 
 
Differences from Other Constructionist Models 
 
Although the Conceptual Act Model is similar (and builds on) other 
constructionist approaches to emotion, it also has some unique and distinctive 
features. In the long tradition of constructionist approaches to emotion, scientists 
used the conceptual tools available to them. The same is true for the conceptual act 
model.  
Unlike prior constructionist models, the Conceptual Act Model is not a two-
stage model where unexplained or ambiguous physical arousal (e.g., Mandler, 
1975; Schachter & Singer, 1962) or core affect (Russell, 2003) is later interpreted 
or cognitively elaborated after the fact. The conceptual act model makes reference 
to several psychological primitives that are always in play. These systems are 
continually shaping one another via the logic of constraint satisfaction (Barrett, 
Ochsner, & Gross, 2007) to produce an emergent phenomenon: an experience of 
anger, or an experience of someone else (even a rat) as angry.  
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Unlike many other constructionist models, the Conceptual Act Model does not 
treat emotions as special mental events (e.g., states of ambiguous arousal) that turn 
on and off in response to a stimulus. Nor are the "cognitive" influences in emotion 
deliberate, or necessarily produced by affiliation, attribution, or interpretation. 
Instead, the model presumes that psychological primitives are always running, and 
when they combine in particular ways, people name those mental states "anger" or 
"sadness" or "fear." The idea is that psychological primitives combine like 
ingredients in various recipes to make a variety of mental states-only some of 
which people experience "emotion". 
The Conceptual Act Model is also broadly consistent with the componential 
approaches found in the appraisal perspective on emotion, to the extent that 
appraisals can be thought of as descriptions of mental content that resulting from 
conceptual knowledge about emotion. What differentiates the conceptual act model 
from these most appraisal perspectives is the emphasis on categorization processes 
as a core mechanism driving the emergence of emotion. Separate cognitive 
mechanisms for computing a situation's meaning (as found in some appraisal 
models, e.g., Lazarus, 1991; Roseman et al., 1990; Scherer, 1984) are not necessary 
to account for emotion. Appraisals, instead, represent dimensions of meaning that 
are associated with particular emotions (e.g., Clore & Ortony, 2000; Frijda, 1986; 
Ortony et al., 1988).  
 
Moving the Study of Emotion Forward  
 
The Conceptual Act Model also allows the field to move past several 
distinctions within the emotion literature that, while useful for a time, might in the 
end be seen as obstacles to progress: nature vs. nurture; evolution vs. social 
construction; categories vs. dimensions; and, automatic vs. controlled processing.  
 First, the Conceptual Act Model avoids the false dichotomy between nature 
and nurture and represents a model of emotion that is grounded in nature without 
being a nativist. Every human thought, feeling, and behavior must be causally 
reduced to the firing of neurons in the human brain. Prior experience and learning 
are encoded as neuronal connections within the human brain, so even a strict 
constructionist approach must have some grounding in nature.  
Second, the model avoids the distinction between evolution and social 
construction by suggesting that core affect and conceptualization processes are 
themselves given by nature (in that humans are born with the ability to have simple 
affective responses and quickly acquire perceptual categories that develop into a 
conceptual system that provides the grounding for perception), although the content 
that they represent is learned and may vary across individuals and cultures. In this 
view, then, the evolutionary legacy to the newborn is not a set of modular emotion 
circuits that are hardwired into the subcortical features of the mammalian brain, but 
may be, instead, a set of mechanisms that compute core affect and allow affective 
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learning, as well as those that allow conceptual learning and categorization. The 
ability to categorize confers adaptive advantage, and so it is likely biologically 
preserved, even if the specific categories are not. The specific categories are more 
likely culture-sensitive solutions to common problems that derive from our major 
adaptive advantage as a species: living in complex social groups. From this point of 
view, it is conceptual and affective processes themselves, rather than the contents 
that they produce (in the form of emotion) that form the basic psychological truths 
about what emotions are and how they work. 
Third, the model favors neither a dimensional nor a categorical approach, but 
instead integrates the two. The dimensional aspect can be found in the suggestion 
that all emotional events, at their core, are based in a psychologically primitive kind 
of affective response to events in the world as positive or negative, helpful or 
harmful (although the neural states that instantiate a pleasant or unpleasant affective 
state may be numerous and varied). The categorical aspect can be found in the 
suggestion that people automatically and effortlessly categorize the ebb and flow of 
core affect using conceptual knowledge for emotion.  
Finally, the model does not rely on the automatic vs. controlled processing 
distinction that is the hallmark of dual process models of the mind and that has 
caused great confusion in the emotion literature of the past (e.g., the Lazarus-
Zajonc debate). In the constraint-satisfaction logic employed by the Conceptual Act 
Model, processes are not themselves automatic or controlled. Rather, bottom-up 
(sensory) information from the world and the body and top-down (conceptual) 
associative processing interact and shape one another so that every psychological 
moment (i.e., an instance of emotion) emerges in a way that can be characterized 
somewhere along an automatic-controlled continuum, and can be said to have some 





Originally, psychologists believed that people, like physical objects, had real 
and immutable properties that could be objectively observed, so that it was possible 
to quantify how accurately a perceiver could perceive those properties (Brunswick, 
1947). For example, if dominance is a real property that can be quantified, then it 
should be possible to assess how accurate we are in judging a person as dominant 
or not. Very quickly, however, the field shifted away from questions about 
accuracy because the person-properties under investigation – traits – defied simple 
measurement and clear definition. Instead, researchers became interested in 
understanding the processes of person perception - how perceivers infer the 
properties of others – in particular, why they see certain behaviors, and how they 
come to understand what caused those behaviors (e.g., Heider, 1944). 
Social psychology has now accumulated a large and nuanced body of research 
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on how people perceive and make inferences about the causes of other people's 
behavior (for a historical review, see Gilbert, 1998). Now, the word "perception" is 
used to refer to the process of assigning someone (or his or her behavior) to a 
meaningful category so that a perceiver "sees" an instance of that category and can 
infer something about the person's internal state and/or enduring disposition. In 
essence, "perception" now refers to the process of categorization (Allport, 1954; 
Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). The general idea is that knowledge of people and 
situations automatically and effortlessly shapes the behaviors people "see" and 
gives rise to their explanations for those behaviors. 
And so it is with emotion. The Conceptual Act Model treats emotion as a 
mental event that results from a form of person-perception that is applied not only 
to the mental states and behaviors of other people, but also to those of the self (and 
to animals). Knowledge about emotion in automatically and effortless shapes the 
emotions people see in others, and experience themselves. By employing the notion 
of situated conceptualizations, it predicts that emotions are not static entities, but 
rather are context-sensitive emergent phenomena. And it explains how one instance 
of anger (or of any emotion category) may not look or feel like another, and yet all 
can be rightly called instances of emotion are "anger". Labeling a mental event or 
behavior as "anger" does not explain what caused the event or behavior. At the 
writing of this paper, there is still no objective criterion that a scientist can use to 
say when a person is angry and when he or she is not. And yet, with the Conceptual 
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